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CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORA-
TION DIRECrORS.-[New York] Ber-
nard K. Marcus and Saul Singer
were charged with violation of N.
Y. Penal Law sec. 305, for abstract-
ing and misapplying funds of the
Municipal Safe Deposit Company of
which they were directors. Both
defendants were also directors and
officers (Marcus president and Sin-
ger vice president) of the Bank of
United States which owned the stock
of the safe deposit company. The
Bank of United States had loaned
to its affiliates (The Bankus, City
Financial, and Municipal Financial
Corporations) $12,000,000, or $8,-
000,000 too much under the Bank-
ing Law limiting loans to ten per
cent of its capital stock. As di-
rectors and principal officers defend-
ants also controlled and dominated
these financial corporations. To re-
duce these excessive loans, the fol-
lowing scheme was pursued. The
three safe deposit companies (de-
fendants were directors of three all
told) borrowed $8,000,000 from the
Bank of United States and with this
bought real estate equities of $4,-
800,000 from the financial corpora-
tions (these real estate equities hav-
ing been valued at $8,000,000 by
Saul Singer on a rapidly falling
market). With the money paid to
them for the real estate equities,
the financial corporations reduced
their indebtedness to the Bank of
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United States by $8,000,000 by the
use of the bank's own inoney. The
purchase of these equities by tric
deposit companies was not made di-
rectly, but by means of two dummy
or "desk drawer corporations"-the
Premier Development Corporation
and the Bolivar Development Cor-
poration. Defendants were found
guilty. Held: on appeal, affirmed:
People v. Marcus (1933) 261 N. Y.
268, 185 N. E. 97.
The defendants were convicted
tinder a section of the New York
penal law which makes it a felony
for any officer, director, employee
or agent of any corporation to which
the banking law is applicable wil-
fully to misapply its credit: N. Y.
Consolidated Laws (Cahill 1930)
ch. 41 (Penal Law), sec. 305. Un-
der this and a similar statute in
Massachusetts (Mass. Cum. Stat-
utes (1927) ch. 266, sec. 53a) in-
tent to defraud is not made an es-
sential element of the crime as con-
trasted with a similar but more
limited law enacted by Congress for
national banks: 12 U. S. C. A. sec.
592.
The court in applying this penal
statute to the instant case proceeded
on the theory that if the defendants
knowingly used the assets of the
deposit companies "for other than
corporate purposes of proper and
legitimate investment," even though
they had no intention of cheating
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or defrauding the companies, the
statute had been violated. In other
words Marcus and Singer subjected
themselves to criminal liability by
wilfully abstracting funds from the
Municipal Safe Deposit Company,
the actual abstracting being the
loaning of money on questionable
and over-rated real estate and the
use of this money for purposes not
those of the deposit companies.
The dissent pointed out that
though the defendants may have
been guilty of criminal negligence
as to the Bank of United States,
still they were not charged with
such wrong. It was also pointed
out that due to the inter-connection
of the various companies, the de-
fendants thought this plan would
prevent disaster to the whole chain
of banking institutions. Marcus
and Singer claimed that they "acted
in honest reliance upon the advice
of counsel that such use of the
moneys of the safe deposit company
was a proper and legitimate use of
its corporate funds." Thus, though
this use may have been improper,
they can hardly be accused of know-
ingly misapplying these funds and
to sustain conviction under section
305 the People must prove this
knowledge.
Since the statute requires a will-
ful misapplication, the question is
raised in view of this advice of
counsel and the close interlinking
of the various companies, whether
the misapplication was willful. The
dissent considered intent important
in this connection and raised the
question of the majority court's
omission of intent from their inter-
pretation of the statute.
It is interesting at this point to
look to the more limited but similar
federal law. Under this law two
factors must be proved-the willful
misapplication and the intent to in-
jure or defraud: Robinson v. U.
S. (C. C. A. 6th, 1929) 30 F. (2d)
25; 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 592. Never-
theless, the various interpretations
of intent and misapplication under
this statute do differ. Some courts
hold advice of counsel as material,
Bishop v. U. S. (C. C. A. 8th, 1926)
16 F. (2d) 410; or that the essence
of the criminal misapplication is a
conversion of the funds of the cor-
poration to the defendant's or
others' use, Cooper v. U. S. (C. C.
A. 4th, 1926) 13 F. (2d) 16, U. S.
v. Britton, 107 U. S. 655, 2 S. Ct.
512; or that there is a misapplica-
tion even though made in the hope
that the bank's or corporation's wel-
fare would be ultimately promoted
if the necessary effect is or may be
to injure or defraud the bank, U.
S. v. Breese, (D. C. N. C. 1906)
131 Fed. 922, and intent may even
be presumed from such disastrous
effects: Walsh v. U. S. (D. C. Ill.
1909) 174 Fed. 615. In a very
recent case, the federal court went
so far as to say that "intent to de-
fraud may be present even though
pecuniary injury to the bank is not
intended and doesn't occur": Rob-
inson v. U. S., supra (intent to de-
ceive higher officers of the bank
concerning certain fictitious transac-
tions constituted "intent to de-
fraud"). These decisions justify
the conclusion that under the fed-
eral law, with policy and purpose
much the same as the New York
statute, the instant case might reach
a far different result.
In view of the violations of the
banking law in connection with the
Bank of United States, such as the
excessive loans to the subsidiary
corporations, the "desk drawer cor-
porations" and the questionable
value of the securities passed off
on the safe deposit cimpanies, the
conclusion seems justifiable that the
defendants well merited their sen-
tence-this in spite of the significant
but liberal dissent. However, in
spite of the strict construction of
this penal statute the question re-
mains-is a decision like that of the
instant case a sufficient prophylac-
tic? When corporate directors will
gamble with the life earnings of
thousands on falling markets, or
speculate with such funds with the
conviction that the economic equili-
brium can never be disturbed, it
would seem that there are two con-
structive courses open, on the basis
of public policy and considering the
many interests involved. There
should be either a stricter govern-
mental supervision over corporate
affairs, especially in the case of
banks, or a more drastic application
of the penal statutes now applicable.
In the latter a revision of some with
longer sentences might be very ef-
fective in impressing on directors
the duties of trust and loyalty due
a corporation and its stockholders.
FRANcIs ROBERT FITZSIIMONS.
CRIMINAL LAW - ROBBERY - NE-
CESSITY OF FELONIOUS INTENT.-
[Mississippi] Defendant was con-
victed of the crime of robbing the
prosecuting witness of a cow and a
yearling calf. The defendant's dog
had the habit of sucking eggs, and
for a period of about two months
prior to the alleged robbery, this
dog had been making nightly raids
on the witness' hen yard. Although
repeatedly driven away, the dog re-
turned and wandered near the wit-
ness' home where it was killed. On
the following morning the defend-
ant, armed with a shotgun, went
with his two sons into a field where
the witness was at work and ac-
cused the latter of killing the dog,
which act was readily admitted.
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The witness was ordered to throw
up his hands and the defendant
thereupon had his sons search him,
demanding that he either be paid
twenty dollars or turn over a cow
and yearling in payment for the loss
of the dog. Being unable to pay
the twenty dollars and fearing death
or bodily injury, a cow and yearling
were relinquished and driven away.
A statement was made by the de-
fendant that the property could be
redeemed by the payment of twenty
dollars. Held: on appeal, affirmed.
The collection of an unliquidated
claim for damages by force and
violence is robbery: Thomas v.
State (Miss. 1933) 148 So. 225.
However ludicrous the factual
situation, this case serves to raise
some fine distinctions between the
crimes of robbery and larceny. Al-
though robbery has been distin-
guished from assault, larceny, theft,
and forcible trespass, still in a gen-
eric sense larceny and robbery are
but different degrees of the same
crime: Montsdoca v. State (1922)
84 Fla. 82, 93 So. 157, Note 27 A.
L. R. 1291. At common law rob-
bery has been defined as the fel-
onious taking of goods or money
from the person or presence of an-
other by means of force or intimida-
tion: Deal v. United States (1927)
274 U. S. 277, 47 S. Ct. 613; Peo-
ple v. Covelesky (1921) 217 Mich.
90, 185 N. W. 770; O'Donnell v.
People (1906) 224 Ill. 218, 79 N.
E. 639; Langford v. Commonwealth
(1925) 209 Ky. 693, 273 S. W. 492;
Long v. State (1852) 12 Ga. 293.
The robbery statutes of most of the
states are merely reassertions of
this common law definition: Peo-
ple v. Shuler (1865) 28 Cal. 490,
492; State v. Gorham (1875) 55 N.
H. 152, 166. Robbery under these
definitions is obviously a mere ag-
gravated form of larceny, the ag-
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gravation consisting of the use of
actual or constructive violence
against the person of the victim:
Butts v. Commonwealth (1926) 145
Va. 800, 133 S. E. 764; Montsdoca
v. State, supra. In other words,
robbery may be defined as a forcible
larceny from the person: People
v. Clary (1887) 72 Cal. 59, 13 Pac.
77; State v. Wasson (1905) 126
Iowa 320, 101 N. W. 1125; Com-
monwealth v. Clifford (1851) 8
Cush. (62 Mass.) 215. Still, it is
a distinct crime, for there can be
no robbery without violence and no
larceny, including that from the
person, with it: Montsdoca v. State,
supra. A further distinction is
found, however in the fact that lar-
ceny may or may not include a tak-
ing from the person or presence,
whereas the crime of robbery must
include such a taking: Armstrong
v. Commonwealth (1921) 190 Ky.
217, 227 S. W. 162. Secrecy, there-
fore, cannot be an element in the
crime of robbery: State v. Powell
(1889) 103 N. C. 424, 9 S. E. 627.
It thus becomes evident that while
robbery is, like larceny an offense
against property in that there must
be an intent to appropriate the prop-
erty permanently, it is also, and pri-
marily, an offense against the per-
son, with the result that any forcible
taking of personal property from
the possession of a person is rob-
bery. Such a taking will be so con-
sidered even if the force employed
is not actual, but is effective to put
the victim in fear, and the property
is taken from his mere custodian-
ship: People v. Carpenter (1924)
315 Ill. 87, 145 N. E. 664; Bowen v.
State (1915) 16 Ga. App. 110, 84
S. E. 730; Langford v. Common-
weealth, supra; Montsdoca v. State,
supra.
The instant case did not concern
the more obvious distinctions sug-
gested above, but raised the ques-
tion of whether or not felonious
intent is a necessary element of the
crime of robbery. The rule has
been constantly reiterated that no
matter how vicious the taking, still
the crime of robbery will not have
been committed in the absence of
a felonious intention to deprive the
victim of his property permanently:
Kennedy v. State (1922) 208 Ala.
66, 93 So. 822; Butts v. Common-
wealth, supra. The absence of such
intent has resulted in acquittal:
People v. McKeighan (1919) 205
Mich. 367, 171 N. W. 500; State v.
Morris (1924) 96 W. Va. 291, 122
S. E. 914 (in the course of an
arrest); In re Lewis (1897) 83 Fed.
159 (in pursuance of a warrant even
though it be insufficient); Souther-
land v. Commonwealth (1926) 217
Ky. 94, 288 S. W. 1051 (as a matter
of self-protection) ; Johnson v. State
(1923) 24 Okla. Crim. 326, 218 Pac.
179 (by mistake)-; Commonwealth v.
White (1890) 133 Pa. 182, 19 Atl.
350 (as a joke). As a further ex-
tension of this rule, it has been held
Iby the majority that it is not rob-
bery to take property under a bona
fide claim of right or title: State
v. Culpepper (1921) 293 Mo. 249,
238 S. W. 801; State v. Wasson,
supra; People v. Sheasbey (1927)
82 Cal. App. 459, 255 Pac. 836 (spe-
cific property); People v. Hall
(1865) 6 Parker Crim. (N. Y.) 642
(property taken as security); State
v. Steele (1929) 150 Wash. 466, 273
Pac. 742 (money recovered from
an alleged thief). This rule has
also been employed to free from a
charge of robbery persons who have
by force or intimidation proceeded
to the collection of a debt honestly
believed due: State v. Halloway
(1875) 41 Iowa 200; State v. Cul-
pepper, supra; Butts v. Common-
wealth, supra. But cf. Common-
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wealth v. Stebbins (1857) 8 Gray
(74 Mass.) 492 (grabbing and re-
taining bank notes from a table in
payment of a note long over due
held larceny). Apparently, then,
the element of force or intimidation
is not a substitute for the intent to
steal: People v. Sheasbey, 'supra.
But under circumstances similar to
the unusual situation found in the
instant case it has been held by the
two courts previously to consider
the problem, that the rule should
not be extended to protect from a
charge of robbery one who by force
or intimidation collected unliquidated
damages: Fannin v. State (1907)
51 Tex. Crim. 41, 100 S. W. 916,
Note 10 L. R. A. (N. s.) 744; Tipton
v. State (1923) 23 Okla. Crim. 86,
212 Pac. 612, Note 31 A. L. R. 1074.
Cf. People v. Smith (1863) 5 Par-
ker Crim. (N. Y.) 490. In support
of this rule the defendant in the
principal case was found guilty of
robbery despite the fact that it was
acknowledged by the court that he
had no felonious intent. The rea-
son for refusing to extend the rule
of the Culpepper case, supra, was
admittedly due to the fact that the
prosecuting witness' civil liability
was questionable and in any event
he would only have been liable for
unliquidated damages.
Thus in the light of the majority
rule that the element of force or in-
timidation is not a substitute for
the intent to steal, the Fannin and
Tipton, as well as the instant case,
would appear to be contrary to the
common law as well as the statu-
tory doctrines of robbery, with the
possible exception of some sugges-
tions contained in certain obiter
dicta of Justice Clerke in the Smith
case, supra. Although it would
seem necessary in the light of pure
logic, or the doctrine of stare de-
cisis to adhere to the majority rule,
nevertheless, ib is quite apparent
that there was in these cases, such
unreasonable conduct on the part of
the defendant in view of question-
able liability of the victim that the
courts might be justified in meting
out the severe punishment accom-
panying a conviction for robbery.
The policy of the law has never
been to give any man the right to
self-redress except in instances of
self-defense, recaption and reprisals,
entry on lands, and the abatement
of nuisances. In the only two in-
stances of self-redress which relate
to the repossession of property, the
law limits the right to cases where
it can be exercised without force
or terror or any breach of the peace.
Further to allow such conduct to
pass unmolested is, in effect, to take
from a debtor his rights, whereas
he may, as in the instant case, have
a defense to the claim the suffi-
ciency of which can be properly de-
termined only by tribunals appointed
by the law. Even from the stand-
point of the logic which requires
intent to constitute the crime of
robbery, it would also be unjust to
allow an alleged creditor to recover
his demand without requiring him
to prove it, where it is, or may be,
disputed. To allow such a practice
will deprive more debtors of their
rights than cause injuries to credit-
ors. Would, for instance, the law al-
low a man to take money furtively
out of the desk of his alleged debtor
and apply it to the payment of his
debt? He has, in effect, the op-
portunity of doing this under the
majority rule, where he is excused
when his object is to get that which
he honestly believes his due. It is
submitted, however, that his lack of
felonious intent would be as posi-
tive as in the present case. The
only difference would be that in
the one case he obtained the money
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by means which the law, in most
cases, calls justifiable collection of
a debt, while in the case supposed,
he would have obtained it by means
which the law, in ordinary cases,
calls larceny, and no doubt he would
be convicted of larceny in the sup-
posed case.
ROBERT T. WRIGHT.
VENUE IN CONSPIRACY CASES.-
[Illinois] The appellant was con-
victed in the criminal court of Cook
County of conspiracy to obtain
money by false pretenses. It was
admitted that he entered into the
conspiracy in St. Louis, Mo., and
later met with another conspirator
in Springfield, Ill., to do the acts
mentioned in the indictment. A co-
conspirator, Blaine, consummated
the crime in Cook County. The ap-
pellant admitted encouraging, aiding
and abetting the activities of Blaine
in Cook County, but argued that he
was only an accessory who was not
present, and therefore not subject
to the jurisdiction of a court of
Cook County. He relied on sec. 4
of div. 10 of the criminal code, Ill.
Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd 1931) ch.
38, sec. 703; "The local jurisdic-
tion of all offenses, not otherwise
provided by law, shall be in the
county where the offense was com-
mitted." He contended that since
the conspiracy was committed in one
county and the overt act was com-
mitted by Blaine in another (Cook)
the charge of conspiracy cannot be
legally laid in Cook County against
him as one of the conspirators as
he was not in Cook County in fur-
therance of the conspiracy, and there-
fore the proof failed to support the
indictment that two or more persons
committed the crime of conspiracy
in Cook County. Held: the overt
act of one of the co-conspirators in
Cook County gave the court juris-
diction over all the conspirators,
even though they had not appeared
in that county in furtherance of the
conspiracy: People v. Miller (1933)
352 Ill. 537, 186 N. E. 180.
The crime of conspiracy is gen-
erally considered to be founded up-
on an unlawful agreement, and no
act in furtherance of the unlawful
design is necessary to complete the
offense: People v. Drury (1929)
335 Ill. 539, 167 N. E. 823; People
v. Glassberg (1917) 326 Ill. 379,
158 N. E. 103; People v. Bluinen-
berg (1915) 271 Ill. 180, 110 N. E.
788. Logically, then, the county
where the conspiracy was formed
would have jurisdiction. But since
conspiracy is in the nature of a con-
tinuous offense, any act of further-
ance of the unlawful design is a re-
newal of the offense: People v.
Drury (1929) 335 Ill. 539, 167 N.
E. 823, and venue may be laid as
to arzy or all conspirators in the
county in which the overt act was
done by any of them: 2 Wharton,
Criminal Procedure (12th ed. 1922)
sec. 1666. Thus a double jurisdic-
tion arises in which a venue of con-
spiracy may be properly laid in
either the county where the unlaw-
ful agreement was made or in the
county where the overt act was
done: Yenckichi v. U. S. (C. C. A.
9th, 1933) 64 F. (2d) 73; Common-
wealth v. Barnes (1932) 107 Pa.
46, 162 Atl. 670; Commonwealth v.
Saul (1927) 260 Mass. 97, 156 N. E.
679. In cases where the overt act
was done in a foreign country the
district court where the conspiracy
was proved had jurisdiction: Hor-
wilz et al. v. United States (C. C.
A. 5th, 1932) 63 F. (2d) 706.
Where the conspiracy was com-
mitted in a foreign country, the dis-
trict court where the overt act was
proved had jurisdiction: United
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States v. Ford (1927) 273 U. S. 593,
47 S. Ct. 531. The rule allowing
double jurisdiction is a practical
one inasmuch as it is often impos-
sible for a grand jury to find just
where the conspiracy was formed.
Its constitutionality has been set-
tled in Hyde v. U. S. (1912) 225
U. S. 347, 32 S. Ct. 793; Armour
Packing Co. v. U. S. (1908) 209
U. S. 56, 28 S. Ct. 474, where it
has been said that where a continu-
ing offense is committed in more
than one district, the Sixth Amend-
ment does not preclude a trial in
any one of those districts. The con-
stitutional requirement is that the
crime shall be tried in the state or
district where the party committing
it happened to be at the time. This
distinction is brought out in the case
of In Re Palliser (1890) 136 U. S.
257, 265, 10 S. Ct. 1034, and reaf-
firmed in the Hyde case.
Another question arises when the
conspirator is tried in the county
where the overt act was done, but
where this particular conspirator
had never been physically present in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Can
he be deemed present even though
it was actually his co-conspirator
who had done the act? In con-
spiracy at common law, each con-
spirator was responsible in any
place where any overt act by one
of his co-conspirators was done:
Ex parte Rogers (1881) 10 Tex. Cr.
App. 655; Commonwealth v. White
(1877) 123 Mass. 430. In the Fed-
eral courts it has generally been
held that he would be constructively
present by virtue of the act of his
co-conspirator: Easterday V. Mc-
Carthy (C. C. A. 2nd, 1919) 256
Fed. 651; Hyde v. U. S., supra. In
the Hyde case the majority held
that there may be a constructive
presence distinct from a personal
presence by which a crime may be
consummated, and an overt act of
one is the act of all. Although four
justices dissented, led by Holmes,
the majority holding has been fol-
lowed: Burns v. U. S. (C. C. A.
8th, 1922) 279 Fed. 986; Morris v.
U. S. (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) 7 F.
(2d) 789; Easterday v. McCarthy
(C. C. A. 2d, 1919) 256 Fed. 651.
By a federal statute (U. S. C. tit.
18, sec. 88) an overt act is neces-
sary to complete the federal offense
of conspiracy, whereas most states
follow the common law in holding
that the unlawful agreement in it-
self completes the offense. The dis-
tinction does not, however, affect
the holdings on venue of conspiracy
cases, because, as has been pointed
out, venue may lie in either the dis-
trict where the conspiracy was com-
mitted or where the overt act was
done.
Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent-
ing opinion in the Hyde case,
pointed out serious objections to the
use of the fiction of constructive
presence to draw jurisdiction to the
place of the overt act. Although
by federal statute the overt act is
necessary to complete the offense, it
is in fact no part of the conspiracy:
Hyde v. Shine (1905) 199 U. S. 62,
76, 25 S. Ct. 760. Thus, reasons
Mr. Justice Holmes, it should not
be said that an act constituting no
part of the crime charged, draws
jurisdiction to the place where it is
done. If the conspiracy is present
wherever an overt act is done, it
may be at the choice of the govern-
ment to prosecute in any one of
many states, in none of which the
conspirators have been. This is a
'hardship on the conspirators,
amounting to a grievous wrong.
But in view of the present day need
for every effective weapon to com-
bat organized crime, the use of
double jurisdiction in conspiracy
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cases, is not to be severely con-
demned. In the hands of the prose-
cuting attorneys conspiracy charges
have been very effectively used as
a "catch-all" device for every type
of crime. Everybody from corrupt
bank officials to labor disturbers are
being brought to justice by the use
of this drag-net offense. To restrict
its use would be to hinder greatly
the administration of criminal law.
In practice, prosecution of con-
spirators is greatly facilitated by
allowing it to take place in either
the jurisdiction of the crime or of
the overt act. It may be true that
it is a hardship on the conspirators
to be subject to the jurisdiction of
as many states as there were overt
acts committed, but to hold other-
wise would be to say that once the
place of conspiracy is concealed, as
it may be, they may execute their
crime in every state in the Union
and defeat punishment in all. Rather
should the conspirators be taken
from their homes than the victims
and witnesses of the conspiracy be
taken from theirs.
Theoretically, a conspirator may
be convicted in a state court for his
overt act, and after serving his sen-
tence, may in turn be convicted of
the same offense in each and every
other state where other acts were
committed, as well as in the state
where the conspiracy was originally
formed. In no state could he plead
a former conviction in another state
in bar of his prosecution, because
the overt act in each state con-
stitutes a new offense in the eyes
of the state where it was committed.
Thus be might be convicted for the
same offense in fact, in twenty states
and serve sentences in all. A state
court may take cognizance of a
former conviction in another state
for actually the same offense, but
in the absence of statute there is
nothing to compel this to be done.
As a matter of practice, it is doubt-
ful whether a prosecuting attorney,
knowing the conspirator had pre-
viously served a prison term in an-
other state for the same offense,
would prosecute. Yet there is noth-
ing to stop him, and this fact makes
it a serious consideration whether
Mr. Justice Holmes and the minority
might not be right in their belief
that jurisdiction should not follow
the overt act.
STANLEY A. TWEEDLE.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY. - [Pennsyl-
vania] The defendant Simpson
was tried on an indictment charg-
ing murder in the first degree. The
jury had been sworn, and without
the accused's acquiescence, or any
apparent cause, the jury was dis-
charged on the motion of the state.
Later Simpson was charged with
murder in the second degree and
voluntary manslaughter upon the
original indictment stating (ver-
batim) the same set of facts. The
defendant entered a plea of former
jeopardy, and the prosecution de-
murred. The lower court overruled
the demurrer from which an appeal
was taken. By virtue of the fact
that the appeal involved purely a
question of law the .state had the
right of appeal. Held: on appeal,
reversed. Where the jury is dis-
charged in a capital case before
rendering a verdict, the state may
subsequently try the defendant on
the same indictment for a degree
of homicide less than murder in the
first degree: Commonwealth v.
Simpson (1933) 310 Pa. 380, 165
Atl. 498.
The question that confronted the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
was whether or not the defendant
may be tried again upon the same
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indictment charging murder, when
the state strives not for a convic-
tion for murder in the first degree,
but for murder in the second de-
gree or manslaughter. The major-
ity conceded that Simpson could not
be reindicted on the same set of
facts for first degree murder, as he
then would again be in jeopardy of
life: Hilands v. Commonwealth
(1885) 111 Pa. 1, 2 Atl. 70. Penn-
sylvania has given the double jeop-
ardy provision of the constitution
of that state a singular construc-
tion, holding that this provision
shall apply only to capital punish-
ment cases: Commonwealth v.
Cook (1821) 6 Serg. & R. 577;
McCreary v. Commonwealth (1857)
29 Pa. 323. Although the Penn-
sylvania provision is not unlike that
of the Federal Constitution: "No
person shall, for the same offense
be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb," Pennsylvania Constitution
Art. I, Sec. 10, the courts of that
state have held that language of
this provision must be plainly and
strictly construed. Under the Penn-
sylvania Criminal Code the only
capital case is that of murder in the
first degree, hence the former jeop-
ardy plea applies only to this one
offense wherein under present law,
life or limb is placed in jeopardy,
and as was suggested in the present
case, "if at some future time the
punishment for murder should be
made life imprisonment in all cases,
the clause in question would be of
no service." The United States Su-
preme Court in construing the
double jeopardy provision of the
Federal Constitution has extended
the protection of this clause to all
criminal offenses: Ex Parte Lange
(1874) 18 Wall. 163; Berkowitz v.
United States (C. C. A. 3d. 1899)
93 Fed. 452; Murphy v. United
States (C. C. A. 7th 1923) 285 Fed.
801. The majority of the states are
in accord with the Federal view:
City of St. Paul v. Stamn (1908)
106 Minn. 81, 118 N. W. 154; Brink
v. State (1885) 18 Tex. Cr. App.
344; Hazelton v. State (1915) 13
Ala. 243, 68 So. 715; People v.
Miner (1893) 144 Ill. 308, 33 N. E.
40. "The plea of once in jeopardy
on a statutory bar applies to all
misdemeanors as well as felonies":
Ex parte Harron (1923) 191 Cal.
457, 217 Pac. 728. Following the
rationale of its precedents the court
in the instant case utilized this con-
struction to modernize criminal law
procedure. It openly declared that
the law must throw off unnecessary
steps in order to keep apace with
organized crime, reasoning that on
a trial for first degree murder, the
jury being discharged before ver-
dict, the defendant should not be
set scot free, for his offense which,
as the proofs showed rose no higher
than manslaughter; whereas if the
indictment in the first instance had
been drawn for manslaughter, the
court could have achieved a suc-
cessful conviction.
A vigorous and sharp dissent was
directed against the majority. The
minority, even though cognizant of
the construction of the jeopardy
provision, objected strongly to its
application to this particular case,
holding, "Heretofore this court has
uniformly held that when a defend-
ant is called to answer an indict-
ment charging murder, and the jury
is sworn, and then, before verdict is
rendered, the jury is, without the
defendant's consent and without ab-
solute necessity, discharged, the de-
fendant cannot again be tried on
the same indictment if he has in-
terposed the plea of former jeop-
ardy." A person having been ac-
quitted on an indictment, it is not
permissible to use this same indict-
RECENT CRIMINAL CASES 783
ment, with the same facts, to re-
indict him again: Hilands v. Com-
vionwealth (1885) 111 Pa. 1, 2 Atl.
70. In Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick
(1886) 121 Pa. 109, 15 Atl. 466,
where the jury had been discharged
for failing to agree, the court held
that this was a bar to a subsequent
trial on the same indictment.
The majority opinion does not
clearly define its reasoning, and it
can be said that other jurisdictions
will not follow the principle of
allowing the discarded indictment to
be used on a subsequent charge.
"Where a person is prosecuted for
an offense and acquitted generally,
* * * I he shall not again be prose-
cuted for any offense, based on the
same act, of which he could have
been convicted on the first prosecu-
tion." Preliminary Draft Number
2; Model Code of Criminal Proced-
ure (Double Jeopardy) Sec. 8. In
section 10 of this code it is said,
"Where proof of the same facts
would be sufficient to convict a per-
son of either of two offenses, an
acquittal or conviction of such per-
son of one of such offenses is a
bar to a prosecution of such person
for the other of such offenses based
on the same facts." Likewise in
the case of State v. Messervery
(1916) 105 S. C. 254, 89 S. E. 662,
two indictments charging the same
offense were drawn against the ac-
cused by different counties. The
defendant asked that he be pro-
tected against the indictment of
county B, as he was on trial on
indictment by county A. The court
said, "If he wanted protection from
the indictment in Colleton county
(B) he now has it, in former jeo-
pardy." A review of the decisions
throughout the United States shows
a general affirmance of the state-
ment of the Model Code of Crim-
inal Procedure, Sec. 8, supra: Peo-
ple v. Dugas (1923) 141 N. E. 769,
310 Ill. 291; Commonwealth v. Wes-
ton (1922) 241 Mass. 131, 135 N.
E. 465. No decisions can be found
in accord with the majority opin-
ion of the preseit case.
On the question of whether or
not the discharge of a jury for
disagreement, without the accused's
consent, shall be a bar to a subse-
quent trial for the same offense,
the majority of the states and the
Federal Courts are not in harmony
with the Pennsylvania holding.
In Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick
(1886) 121 Pa. 109, 15 AUt. 466,
the court held that in consideration
of the fact that the jury had been
out for five days and was dis-
charged, such an action constituted
a bar to a subsequent trial for the
same offense. Accord: State v.
Nelson (1896) 19 R. I. 467, 33 L.
R. A. 559. The Federal Courts
hold that such a discharge of a
jury shall not be a bar: United
States v. Perez (1824) 22 U. S. 9.
Accord: Dobbins v. State (1863)
14 Ohio St. 493; Commonwealth v.
Bowden (1813) 9 Mass. 494; Dreyer
v. People -(1900) 188 Ill. 40, 58 N.
E. 687.
The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania was faced with a difficult de-
cision. Its bench was cognizant of
the dilatory and unnecessary com-
plexities of criminal law procedure.
In its zeal for reform it felt, "...
our present construction comports
more with sound public policy and
with the necessity, now existing in
dealing with lawbreakers, for a
reasonable interpretation of a crim-
inal law." However, it is very
doubtful whether the other states
will follow the precedent set by
Pennsylvania. By virtue of the fact
that other jurisdictions have not
followed the Pennsylvania construc-
tion of the double jeopardy provi-
sion, it seems rather obvious that
this even more restricted application
of that provision will be championed
by Pennsylvania alone.
HAROLD J. HODGSON.
CONFIDENCE GAME- CONDUCT OF
PROSECUTING WITNESS AS A DE-
FENSE. - [California] Defendant
Lewis ingratiated himself into the
company of one Stine. In a hotel
in Oakland defendant Hall ap-
peared, and was introduced to Stine
by Lewis as a betting commissioner
for a wealthy man, and the pos-
sessor of a method by which he
secured infallible tips before eachi
race. Lewis, using Hall's ticket to
a fictitious "exchange," and his
gratuitous advice on the horses, re-
turned several times with sums of
money which purported to be his
winnings. Finally Hall gave him
a faked credit slip for $50,000 and
Lewis reported, after a time, that
he had won $153,000, but would
have to produce $50,000 in cash be-
fore collecting the winnings, in or-
der to demonstrate that he could
have honored the wager in the everit
he had lost. Stine agreed to con-
tribute $10,000 into a pool of $50.000
to gain a share of the winnings.
Later he grew suspicious, and in-
formed the police. The defendants
were convicted of attempt to com-
mit grand theft and conspiracy to
commit the same. Held: on ap-
peal, affirmed. There is no princi-
ple of law which bars a state from
prosecuting a criminal because the
complainant is a particeps criminis:
People v. Hall (Cal. 1933) 23 P.
(2d) 783.
The defendant sought reversal on
the ground that "neither the law nor
public policy designs the protection
of rogues in their dealings with each
other, or to insure fair dealing and
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truthfulness, as between each other,
in their dishonest practices," cit-
ing an old New York case to that
effect: McCord v. People (1848)
46 N. Y. 470. But the court denied
the contention on the ground that
the acts and conduct of the prose-
cuting witness can never bar the
state from the prosecution of a
criminal: People v. Martin (1894)
102 Cal. 558, 36 Pac. 952.
The rule in the McCord case has
often been adverted to under cir-
cumstances similar to those in the
instant case, and has been strongly
criticised. It has been pointed out,
in People v. Tompkins (1906) 186
N. Y. 413, 79 N. E. 326, that the
rule was based upon an earlier case
wherein the assumption was enter-
tained that the New York law rested
upon and was limited to the condi-
tions recited in Stat. 30 Geo. II,
chap. 24-that the law is "designed
to reach the evil-disposed persons
whose stratagems . . . have enabled
them to obtain money to the great
injury of industrious families and
to the manifest injury of trade and
credit": People v. Stetson (1848)
4 Barbour's Reports 151.
This rather righteous limitation
on the law of false pretences has
also been entertained in Wisconsin
in State v. Crowley (1876) 41 Wis.
271, and was adopted as recently as
1915 in Oregon: State v. Alex-
ander (1915) 76 Ore. 329, 148 Pac.
1136. However, most jurisdictions
are in agreement with the theory
governing the case under discussion
limiting the application of the Mc-
Cord case to civil actions: People
v. Koscielniak (1930) 257 Ill. App.
514; State v. Wolf (1926) 168 Minn.
505, 210 N. W. 589; People v. Wat-
son (1889) 75 Mich. 582, 42 N. W.
1005; Cunningham v. State (1897)
38 Atl. 847, 61 N. J. L. 67.
Granting that the principle of the
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McCord case might have possessed
some utility in a less complicated
era when the presumption that
every man knows the law was in-
dulged more completely, by warn-
ing criminals that the law would
not punish those who profited by
their folly, it would seem to have
been based upon a legal misconcep-
tion from the first. The obvious
distinction between civil suits and
indictments for breaches of the crim-
inal law was apparently overlooked.
The doctrine, applied properly in a
civil suit between rogues for con-
tribution or reimbursement, has no
application in a criminal prosecu-
tion against one of several wrong-
doers for a crime committed
against a fellow-criminal, or against
one whose hands are soiled,
at least, by having been involved
in an illegal transaction connected
with the crime. The wrong is per-
petrated against the peace of the
state. The prosecuting witness is
to be regarded as an instrument to
aid the state in punishing a wrong-
doer against its laws, not as an in-
dividual seeking vengeance with the
state as an impartial referee.
More important than any purely
theoretical consideration, practical
necessity censures the rule. At a
time when every resource must be
utilized to keep the criminal at bay,
it would give him an unwarranted
protection by tying the hands of
the prosecution. It grants virtual
immunity to the confidence man
provided the scheme by which his
victim is fleeced involves the vic-
tim's own turpitude. It is a chal-
lenge to him to perfect a plan by
which the victim, perhaps a future
prosecuting witness, will be suffi-
ciently besmirched to protect him.
Nothing could be more carefully de-
signed to encourage the criminal
mind.
CLARKE J. MUNN, JR.
